PRINTcipher-48/96 are 48/96-bit block ciphers proposed in CHES 2010 which support the 80/160-bit secret keys, respectively. In this paper, we propose related-key cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher. To recover the 80-bit secret key of PRINTcipher-48, our attack requires 2 47 related-key chosen plaintexts with a computational complexity of 2 60⋅62 . In the case of PRINTcipher-96, we require 2 95 related-key chosen plaintexts with a computational complexity of 2 107 . These results are the first known related-key cryptanalytic results on them.
Introduction
Recently, the security of constrained hardware environments such as RFID tags and sensor nodes is major topic in cryptography [1, 2] . The research on lightweight block ciphers suitable for the efficient implementation in constrained hardware environments such as RFID tags and sensor nodes has been studied. As a result, PRESENT [3] , LED [4] , HIGHT [5] , PRINTcipher [6] , and Piccolo [7] were proposed.
PRINTcipher is a 48/96-bit block cipher proposed in CHES 2010 thst supports the 80/160-bit secret keys. According to the block size, they are denoted by PRINTcipher-48 and PRINTcipher-96, respectively. The attractive properties of PRINTcipher are that all rounds use the same round key and differ only by a round counter and that the linear layer is partially key-dependent. Because of these properties, most known cryptanalytic results on PRINTcipher are based on weak keys (see Table 1 ). The best attack results on PRINTcipher are invariance subspace attacks on the full PRINTcipher-48/96 [8] . In detail, the attack on the full PRINTcipher-48 is applicable to 2 52 weak keys and requires 5 chosen plaintexts with a negligible computational complexity. In the case of the full PRINTcipher-96, it is applicable to 2 102 weak keys and requires 5 chosen plaintexts with a negligible computational complexity.
In this paper, we find weakness of PRINTcipher-48/96 on related-key attacks. To construct related-key differential characteristics, we focus on related keys that have different values in the part related to a key-dependent permutation. Thus, we can construct -round related-key differential characteristics with a probability of 2 − . By using these characteristics, we can recover the secret keys of PRINTcipher-48/96. Our results are summarized in Table 1 . In detail, to recover the 80-bit secret key of PRINTcipher-48, our attack requires 4 related keys, 2 47 related-key chosen plaintexts, and a computational complexity of 2 60.62 . In the case of PRINTcipher-96, we require 4 related keys, 2 95 related-key chosen plaintexts, and a computational complexity of 2 107 . These results are the first known related-key cryptanalytic results on them.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe briefly the structure of PRINTcipher. In Section 3, we explain how to construct related-key differential characteristics on PRINTcipher. Related-key attacks on PRINTcipher-48 and PRINTcipher-96 are proposed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, we give our conclusion in Section 6. 
Description of PRINTcipher
PRINTcipher-48/96 are 48/96-bit block ciphers supporting the 80/160-bit secret keys. Note that PRINTcipher uses the same round key ( 1 , 2 ) for all rounds. In detail, the secret key is divided into ( 1 , 2 ). 1 is used to XORing with an intermediate value, and 2 controls a key-dependent permutation. Figure 1 presents a single round of PRINTcipher-, where ∈ {48, 96}. The encryption process of PRINTcipher-is as follows. Here, the number of rounds is . A -bit round key 1 = ( 1 0 , . . . , 1 −1 ) and a (2 /3)-bit round key 2 = ( 2 0 , . . . , 2 /3−1 ); here, 1 0 is the most significant bit of 1 .
(1) A -bit plaintext = ( 0 , 1 , . . . , −1 ) is loaded to a -bit intermediate value = ( 0 , 1 , . . . , −1 ).
(2) For = 1, . . . , , do the following steps.
(a) is XORed with a -bit round key 1 . Consider ← ⨁ 1 ( = 0, 1, . . . , − 1) .
is the th key-dependent permutation based on a 2-bit 2 = ( 2 ,0 , 2 ,1 ) (see Figure 1 ). (e) Consider that is mixed by using /3 identical 3 × 3 -boxes.
(3) = ( 0 , . . . , −1 ) ← .
With a bit permutation , a value of the bit position is moved to the bit position , where
In a key-dependent permutation , an intermediate value is arranged in /3 blocks of 3 bits each, which are permuted individually according to a 2-bit 2 . Out of 6 possible permutations on 3 bits, only four permutations are valid for PRINTcipher. In detail, as shown in Table 2 , a 3bit input value ( 0 , 1 , 2 ) is permuted to the corresponding output value according to a 2-bit ( 2 ,0 , 2 ,1 ). Here, means in the case that ( 2 ,0 , 2 ,1 ) = ( , ).
Construction of Related-Key Differential Characteristics on PRINTcipher
In this section, we present how to construct -round relatedkey differential characteristics on PRINTcipher-48/96 by using properties of a key-dependent permutation andbox.
Related-Key Properties on Key-Dependent Permutation
and -Box. We consider a 3-bit input value ( 0 , 1 , 2 ) of International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 3 Notation
a key-dependent permutation ( = 0, . . . , 15). If a 2-bit round key ( 2 ,0 , 2 ,1 ) is equal to (0, 0) or (0, 1), from Table 2 , the corresponding output value is computed as follows:
In the above relations, if 0 is equal to 1 , each permutation outputs the same value and vice versa. That is, the following equation holds:
In total, we can obtain the following six properties of .
Property 1. Consider 0 = 1 ⇔ 00 (( 0 , 1 , 2 )) = 01 (( 0 , 1 , 2 )). Property 2. Consider 1 = 2 ⇔ 00 (( 0 , 1 , 2 )) = 10 (( 0 , 1 , 2 )). Property 3. Consider 0 = 2 ⇔ 00 (( 0 , 1 , 2 )) = 11 (( 0 , 1 , 2 )).
Property 4. Consider 0 = 1 = 2 ⇔ 01 (( 0 , 1 , 2 )) = 10 (( 0 , 1 , 2 )).
Furthermore, from the definition of -box , we can obtain the following property.
Property 7. If 00 and 01 have the same input value , the output difference of -box, (( 00 ( ))) ⊕ ( 01 ( )), should be included in a set {0, 2, 4}.
Related-Key Differential Characteristics on
PRINTcipher-48. Among the above seven properties, we focus on Properties 1, 2 and 3. To apply these properties on the proposed attack, we first consider the following related-key pairs ( = ( 1 , 2 ), * = ( 1 * , 2 * )). Here, = 0, . . . , 15.
Case 1 (l). Consider the following:
(ii) 2 = (0, 0), 2 * = (0, 1);
Case 2 (l). Consider the following:
Case 3 (l). Consider the following:
We assume that the input difference of the target round is zero. If a related-key pair ( , * ) satisfies Case 1 (0), 0 has a nonzero related-key difference. Here, from Property 1, it can be easily shown that the output difference of 0 is zero with a probability of 2 −1 (i.e., the probability that 0 is equal to 1 ). Since the output differences of other 's except 0 are zero, as shown in Figure 2 , we can construct a 1-round related-key differential characteristic 0 Case 1 (0) → 0 with a probability of 2 −1 under Case 1 (0). Since PRINTcipher-48 uses the same round key for all rounds, we can easily extend this result to a -round related-key differential characteristic. That is, we can construct a -round related-key differential characteristic Note that we cannot control the exact values of the related-key pair ( , * ) under a related-key attack scenario. In other words, we cannot apply the above related-key differential characteristics to our attack directly. To solve this problem, for each , we consider the following four related keys simultaneously. Here, means the right secret key of PRINTcipher-48. From these four related keys, we can combine six related-key pairs. For each value of 2 , a related-key pair is satisfied one among three cases, Case 1 ( ), Case 2 ( ), and Case 3 ( ) (see Table 3 ). For example, we assume that 2 is equal to (1, 0). Then, four related keys are computed as follows.
Recall that the condition of Case 1 ( ) is that 2 = (0, 0) and 2 * = (0, 1). Thus, ( (1,0) , (1, 1) ) satisfies this condition. Similarly, the condition of Case 2 ( ) is that 2 = (0, 0) and 2 * = (1, 0). Thus, ( (1,0) , (0,0) ) satisfies this condition.
If 2 is equal to (0, 0), three related-key pairs ( (0,0) , (0,1) ), ( (0,0) , (1, 0) ), and ( (0,0) , (1, 1) ) satisfy Case 1 ( ), Case 2 ( ), and Case 3 ( ), respectively (see Table 3 ). It means that -round related-key differential characteristics → 0 are satisfied with a probability of 2 − , respectively. However, if 2 is not equal to (0, 0), only one of related-key pairs satisfies the corresponding condition. For example, it is assumed that the right 2 is (1, 0). Only one key pair, ( (0,0) , (1,0) ), among three related-key pairs is satisfied Case 2 ( ) from Table 3 . It means that the corresponding differential characteristic 
Related-Key Differential Characteristics on PRINTcipher-96.
In the case of PRINTcipher-96, we can construct 96(= 3 ⋅ 32) -round related-key differential characteristics with a probability 2 − by using the similar method on PRINTcipher-48. In detail, for each , we can obtain the same six Table 3 : The corresponding related-key pair according to the value of 2 .
properties and three cases, Case 1 ( ), Case 2 ( ), and Case 3 ( ). Thus, we get three -round related-key differential characteristics for each ( = 0, . . . , 31).
Related-Key Cryptanalysis on PRINTcipher-48
We are ready to propose related-key cryptanalysis on PRINTcipher-48. Recall that we can construct -round related-key differential characteristics on PRINTcipher-48 with a probability of 2 − . These related-key differential characteristics depend on the concrete key value. However, the attacker did not control the exact key value under a relatedkey attack scenario.
To solve this, we use 4 related keys (0,0) Our attack procedure mainly consists of the following steps. First, we consider plaintext structures which are composed of 4 plaintexts each. Second, we discard the wrong ciphertext pairs from the difference between ciphertexts. Finally, we guess the partial secret key and determine relatedkey pairs satisfying Case 1 (0).
Collection of Ciphertexts.
First, we consider the following plaintext structures S 0 , 1 which are composed of 4 plaintexts each (see Figure 3 ).
(c) 0 : arbitrary 15-bit value; (d) 1 : arbitrary 31-bit value.
Among all possible sixteen plaintext pairs for each plaintext structure, we consider only the following 8 plaintext pairs:
Recall that ( (0,0) 0 , (0,1) 0 ) is assumed to satisfy Case 1 (0). Thus, for only four plaintext pairs in each plaintext structure, the input difference of round 2 is zero. Here, when we use 2 44 plaintext structures, the expected number of right pairs is 4(= 4 ⋅ 2 44 ⋅ 2 −44 ). Note that our related-key differential characteristics hold with a probability of 2 −44 .
Filtering the Wrong Pairs.
We discard the wrong ciphertext pairs by checking the difference between ciphertexts. For the right ciphertext pair, the output difference of round 45 should be zero as shown in Figure 3 .
In round 46, from Property 7, the possible output difference of the first -box is 0 or 2 or 4. The differential propagation in round 47∼48 is shown in Figure 3 . Then, we discard the wrong ciphertext pairs by checking the following three checkPoints.
(i) ℎ 1 . The difference between the rightmost 30 bits of ciphertext is zero.
(ii) ℎ 2 . The output difference of 1 , 2 , . . . , 5 in round 48 should be included in a set {0, 1, 2, 4}.
The input difference of 0 should be included in a set {0, 4}.
Since the filtering probability of this step is 2 −37 (= 2 −30 ⋅ 2 −1⋅5 ⋅ 2 −2 ), 2 10 (= 8 ⋅ 2 44 ⋅ 2 −37 ) ciphertext pairs are survived.
Recovery of the Secret Key of PRINTcipher-48.
For each ciphertext pair passing the above steps, we guess the following 16-bit key:
Then we recover 16-bit key by checking the following checkPoints (see Figure 3 ). (iii) ℎ 6 . Output difference of the first -box in round 46 should be 0 or 2 or 4.
First, we check ℎ 4 . In this step, we guess a 10-bit key ( 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 5 ). Since the filtering probability of this step is 2 −5 , 2 5 (= 2 10 ⋅ 2 −5 ) ciphertext pairs remained for each guessed key. Then, we guess an additional 6-bit key ( 1 0 , 5 ) and check ℎ 5 and ℎ 6 . Since the filtering probabilities of this step are 2 −4 ( ℎ 5 ) and 0.75 ( ℎ 6 ), the expected number of the remaining ciphertext pairs is 1.5 for each guessed key. Finally, we determine the guessed key with the maximal number of remaining ciphertext pairs as the right key.
Until now, we introduced the attack procedure with a related-key pair ( (0,0) 0 , (0,1) 0 ). In case of the related-key pair ( (1,0) 0 , (1,1) 0 ), the attack procedure can be explained in a similar fashion. Our attack procedure on the full PRINTcipher-48 is summarized as follows. Figure 3 : Basic related-key differential attack on PRINTcipher-48. Step 3, we can recover the 17-bit information on the 80bit secret key of PRINTcipher-48. Thus, a computational complexity of Step 5 is 2 63 PRINTcipher-48 encryptions. Hence, a total computational complexity of our attack is 2 63 . . In this subsection, we improve the basic related-key attack on the full PRINTcipher-48. To improve the basic attack, we consider 43-round related-key differential characteristic 0 Case 1 (0) → 0 (from round 2 to round 44) with a probability of 2 −43 . The overall attack procedure is similar to the basic attack procedure. (4) Output the guessed key with the maximal count as the right key.
Complexities of Basic Related-Key

Improved Related-Key Attack on
(5) Do an exhaustive search for the remaining secret key using trial encryption.
Complexities of Improved Related-Key Attack on
PRINTcipher-48. The improved attack uses 4 related keys ( (0,0) , (0,1) , (1, 0) , and (0,0) ) and 2 47 related-key chosen plaintexts. Hence, a data complexity of our attack is 2 47 related-key chosen plaintexts. A computational complexity of Step 1 is 2 47 PRINTcipher-48 encryptions.
In Step 2(a) and
Step 3(a), similar to the basic attack, we discard wrong ciphertext pairs by checking the following three checkPoints (see Figure 4 ).
(i) ℎ 7 . The output difference of 2 , 3 , . . . , 15 in round 48 should be included in a set {0, 1, 2, 4}.
(ii) ℎ 8 . The input difference of 0 in round 48 should be included in a set {0, 2, 4, 6}.
(iii) ℎ 9 . The output difference of 1 in round 48 should be included in a set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
The filtering probability of this step is computed as follows:
) . ) .
For each remaining ciphertext pair, we guess total 48-bit key ( 2 1 , . . . , 2 15 , 1 0 , . . . , 1 17 ). Then we recover 16-bit key by checking the following checkPoints.
(i) ℎ 10 . Input difference of 2 , 3 , . . . , 15 in round 48 should be included in a set {0, 4}.
(ii) ℎ 11 . Input difference of 1 in round 48 should be included in a set {0, 2, 4, 6}.
(iii) ℎ 12 . Input difference of 0 , . . . , 5 in round 47 should be included in a set {0, 4}.
(iv) ℎ 13 . Input difference of 0 and 1 in round 46 should be included in a set {0, 4}.
(v) ℎ 14 .Output difference of the first -box in round 45 should be included in a set {0, 2, 4}.
In Step 2(b) and
Step 3(b), we guess 30-bit key ( 2 1 , . . . , 2 15 and check ℎ 10 and ℎ 11 . The filtering probability of this step is computed as follows:
) . ) in order to check ℎ 12 , ℎ 13 , and ℎ 14 . Similar to the basic attack, the expected number of the remaining ciphertext pairs is 1.5 for each guessed key. Note that the expected number of right pairs is 4 similar to the basic attack.
Since we can recover the 49-bit information on the 80-bit secret key of PRINTcipher-48, a computational complexity of Step 5 is 2 31 PRINTcipher-48 encryptions. Hence, a total computational complexity of our attack is computed as follows:
2 60.62 (≈ 2 47 + 2 55.22 + (3 ⋅ 2 59 ) + 2 31 ) .
(9)
Related-Key Cryptanalysis on PRINTcipher-96
The overall attack procedure on the full PRINTcipher-96 is similar to that on the full PRINTcipher-48. Thus, we explain the attack procedure on the full PRINTcipher-96 briefly.
In this attack, we consider 91-round related-key differential characteristics 0
Case 1 (0) → 0 (from round 2 to round 92) with a probability of 2 −91 . The checkPoints used in this attack are as follows (see Figure 5 ). ?00 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
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. . . (c) Guess 18-bit key ( 1 0 , . . . , 1 17 ) and count the ciphertext pairs satisfying ℎ 19 , ℎ 20 , and ℎ 21 .
(4) Output the guessed key with the maximal count as the right key.
(5) Do an exhaustive search for the remaining secret key using trial encryption. ) are used in our attack, the data complexity of our attack is 2 95 related-key chosen plaintexts. And a total computational complexity of our attack is about 2 107 PRINTcipher-96 encryptions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed related-key cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher. Our attack results are summarized in Table 1 . To recover the 80-bit secret key of PRINTcipher-48, our
